UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,:
Plaintiff,:
Civil Action No.
W.R. GRACE & CO., -CONN.,: OPINION Defendant.:Dated: November 10, 1998
JOEL A. PISANO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Before the Court is Wayne Township's motion to intervene in this CERCLA case between the United States and W.R. Grace. Defendants filed opposition, while the United States filed papers but took no position on the motion to intervene. The Court heard oral argument from Wayne Township, the United States, and W.R. Grace on October 26, 1998, and reserved judgment in order to issue this opinion. For the reasons set forth below, Wayne Township's motion to intervene is denied.
BACKGROUND Between 1948 and 1961, Rare Earths, Inc., processed monazite sand at an industrial site in Wayne, New Jersey. Rare Earths used the yield of this process to produce eyeglass polishing compound. Radioactive thorium was a by-product of the processing of the monazite sand. In accordance with then-applicable government standards, Rare Earths disposed of the thorium on site in Wayne. The plant discontinued processing monazite sand in 1962, and all operations at the Wayne site ceased in 1971.
W.R. Grace & Co. is the successor to Rare Earths, Inc. In the 1970s and 1980s, W.R. Grace and the federal government undertook to decontaminate the site. Originally, government studies recommended an “on-site treatment remedy,” but political pressure later forced the government to seek an off-site disposal remedy. At oral argument, counsel informed the Court that the current off-site remedy consists of excavating the site and shipping the soil using trucks and railcars from New Jersey to a Utah desert.
In November 1995, the government initiated negotiations with W.R. Grace, seeking monetary contribution to the clean-up effort. The United States and W.R. Grace negotiated for three years, and in April 1998, filed a consent decree with the federal district court pursuant to § 122 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). In September 1998, the Township of Wayne moved to intervene because, in its view, the amount of money provided by W.R. Grace pursuant to the consent decree is inadequate.
DISCUSSION The Township of Wayne relies upon three bases in asserting that it has a right to intervene: (1) § 113(i) of CERCLA; (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) (Intervention of Right); and (3) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) (Permissive Intervention). Cases apply the same essential test when determining whether or not to grant intervention under both CERCLA § 113(i) and Rule 24(a)(2). See United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1994). Therefore, the discussion that follows will examine whether to grant intervention (1) as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or CERCLA § 113(i); or (2) permissively under Rule 24(b).

TEMPTATIONS, INC.,:
Plaintiff, :
CAROL WAGER and : OPINION
MATTHEW WAGER, :
Defendants. :
Walls, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on an appeal by defendants Carol and Matthew Wager from the magistrate judge's order to remand the case to New Jersey state court, and/or in the alternative, a motion for the enforcement of the final judgment and settlement agreement in Civ. No. 97-4540. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, the Court decides these matters without oral argument. The order of the magistrate judge is vacated, the case is remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, and defendants' motion for the enforcement of the final judgment and settlement agreement in Civ. No. 97-4540 is denied.
FACTS Plaintiff Temptations, Inc. (“Temptations”), a New Jersey corporation engaged in the sale of women's fashion accessories, sued defendants Carol and Matthew Wager in New Jersey state court alleging three causes: defamation, interference with prospective economic advantage, and interference with contract. Plaintiff alleged that defendants falsely communicated to others that it was “selling merchandise that duplicated exactly a design which defendants stated was copyrighted by another.” (Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff complained that this statement was defamatory, and that through this statement, defendants interfered with plaintiff's economic advantage and caused a breach or termination of plaintiff's contractual relations with its customers and/or suppliers. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11.)
Defendant Carol Wager is a marketing consultant and her defendant husband, Matthew Wager, a financial consultant. Both are familiar with the costume jewelry industry and were retained by Barry Kieselstein-Cord and Barry Kieselstein Enterprises, Inc. (“BKE”) “to investigate the unauthorized sale and distribution of jewelry accessories infringing upon those manufactured and sold by BKE [and] protected by its copyrights and trademarks.” (C. Wager Aff. ¶ 1.) Defendants claim that in May, 1997 they were engaged to investigate the activities of Temptations, Inc. and informed Barry Kieselstein-Cord and BKE of their findingsthat jewelry items sold by Temptations were replicas or “knock-offs” of BKE jewelry. (M. Wager Aff. ¶ 11.)
In September, 1997, Barry Kieselstein-Cord and BKE filed a copyright and trademark infringement suit in this Court against Temptations, and two other defendants, Annette Mayo, president of Temptations and Diane Levy, a Temptations employee. See Civ. No. 97-4540. Later, in November, 1997, the parties entered into a settlement agreement wherein defendants admitted no intentional wrongdoing, denied the allegations of the complaint, and agreed to pay plaintiffs $2,140 in damages, profits, costs and attorneys' fees. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs released the defendants from any and all claims of the complaint. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.) Defendants released the plaintiffs, “their officers, agents, directors, shareholders and employees from any and all claims or possible claims or future claims which could have been made or asserted against plaintiffs.” (Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.) On December 12, 1997, the District Court entered a Final Judgment Upon Consent (“Final Judgment”), which enjoined Temptations, Annette Mayo, Diane Levy, “their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys-in-fact and all persons in active concert and participation with them” from using plaintiffs' trademark and from infringing upon plaintiffs' copyrights. (Final Judgment ¶ 4.) The defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs an amount in settlement for damages, profits, costs, disbursements and attorneys' fees. (Final Judgment ¶ 5.) This Court retained jurisdiction over that case, Civ. No. 97-4540 for the purpose of making any further orders necessary or proper for the construction or modification of the final judgment. (Final Judgment ¶ 6.)
In February, 1998, Temptations filed its complaint against Carol and Matthew Wager in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County. Defendants removed the case to federal court in May, 1998. Shortly afterward, plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court and sought sanctions against defendants. Defendants cross moved to consolidate the case with Civ. No. 97-4540, which was closed, and to enforce the settlement agreement in that case. On July 14, 1998, the magistrate judge remanded the case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions, and denied without prejudice defendants' cross motion to enforce the settlement agreement of Civ. No. 97-4540. Defendants now appeal the magistrate's decision and move to enforce the final judgment and settlement agreement for Civ. No. 97-4540 against plaintiffs.

CHAMBERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.
NICHOLAS H. POLITAN FEDERAL BUILDING &
U.S. COURTHOUSE JUDGE 50 WALNUT ST., ROOM 5076
P.O. BOX 999
NEWARK, N.J. 07101-0999
March 19, l999 Lennox S. Hinds, Esq.
STEVENS, HINDS & WHITE, P.C.
116 West 111th Street New York, NY 10026
Attorneys for Plaintiff James L. Plosia, Jr., Esq.
APRUZZESE, MC DERMOTT, MASTRO & MURPHY Somerset Hills Corporate Center 25 Independence Blvd.
P O Box 112
Liberty Corner, NJ 07938
Attorneys for Defendant Borough of Tinton Falls Re: Deirdre A. Jones v. Borough of Tinton Falls, et al.
Civil Action No. 98-2182 (NHP)
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court has decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons explained below, defendants' motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. BACKGROUND This civil rights action arises out of plaintiff's employment as a probationary police officer in the Borough of Tinton Falls. She was terminated by her employer in December of 1996. On September 29, 1997, plaintiff filed a civil action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Monmouth County, asserting both statutory and constitutional claims arising under both federal and state law. Her complaint sought reinstatement, backpay and seniority, and attorneys' fees. On January 9, 1998, the Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint “with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Jones v. Borough of Tinton Falls, No. Mon-L-5133-97, attached as Exhibit C to Brief in Support of defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
DISCUSSION This Court will dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, defendants contend that plaintiff cannot prevail because New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine bars her claims.
The Entire Controversy Doctrine requires a party to:

GIRISH K. SHARMA,:
SARITA SHARMA, SAMIR SHARMA and:
SARIKA SHARMA, Petitioners, Civil Action No.98-2258(JWB)
v.:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,:
Respondent.:
APPEARANCES:
FRIEDMAN SIEGELBAUM By: Douglas Edlin, Esquire 7 Becker Farm Road Roseland, New Jersey 07068
- and -
SOLOVAY EDLIN & EISEMAN By: Stephen L. Weinstein, Esquire 845 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022
(Of Counsel)
(Attorneys for Petitioners)
FAITH S. HOCHBERG United States Attorney By: Susan Cassell Assistant United States Attorney Federal Building 970 Broad Street Newark, New Jersey 07102
- and -
CHARLES M. FLESCH Trial Attorney, Tax U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 227
Washington, D.C. 20044
(Attorneys for Respondent)
BISSELL, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on respondent's motion to dismiss a petition to quash Internal Revenue Service summonses as moot and on petitioners' cross-motion for an order declaring that the summonses were improperly issued. Petitioners filed their Petition to Quash on May 19, 1998.
The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609.
FACTS This action relates to three summonses for records from petitioners' bank that were issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) on April 29, 1998. By letter dated August 14, 1998, the IRS withdrew those summonses. Before that, on May 19, 1998, petitioners filed their Petition to Quash them.
The United States now moves to dismiss the Petition as moot. Petitioners cross-move for an order declaring that the summonses were improperly issued. Respondent does not respond substantively to the cross-motion, but instead argues that it should not be considered because the case is moot, the cross- motion is unrelated to the dismissal motion, and the cross-motion was not filed in accordance with Local Civil Rule 7.1 and Appendix N.

IN RE: HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS LAN ASSOCIATES XI, L.P.,: CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2286 (JEI)
Debtor.:
BANKR. CASE NO. 92-13413 (JHW)
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE,:
Appellant,: OPINION JAMES J. CAIN,:
Appellee.:
APPEARANCES:
PATRICIA A. STAIANO, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, REGION 3
STEVEN E. MACKEY, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, By: Robert J. Schneider, Senior Attorney One Newark Center, Suite 2100
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for appellant WEINBERG, McCORMICK, CHATZINOFF & PAUL, P.A.
By: Joseph A. McCormick, Jr., Esq.
Anne S. Cantwell, Esq.
109 Haddon Avenue Haddonfield, NJ 08033
Attorneys for appellee THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES By: JOSEPH I. WITTMAN, ESQ.
435 S. Kansas Avenue - 2^nd Floor Topeka, KS 66603-3401
Amicus curiae
IRENAS, District Court:
Presently before this Court is the United States Trustee's appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court awarding compensation to the trustee. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. 158(a)(1).
Title 11, § 326(a), of the United States Code, sets a cap on allowable bankruptcy trustee compensation in chapter 7 and 11 bankruptcy cases. The cap is calculated in a given case by reference to the amount of “moneys disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest.” Specifically, trustee compensation may not exceed certain specified percentages of the amount of moneys disbursed to parties in interest. Pursuant to Title 11, § 363(k), when a trustee sells property to a secured claimholder whose claim is secured by a lien on that property, the secured party may use his lien to pay for the property by offsetting the amount of his lien against the full purchase price of the property. The principal question in this case is whether the maximum allowable compensation for a trustee who sells property in such a “credit bid sale” may be based on the full purchase price. The bankruptcy court held that it may. This Court holds that it may not and will reverse the bankruptcy court's order and remand this case for a new determination of the trustee's compensation award.
I. BACKGROUND On July 26, 1992, Lan Associates XI, L.P. (“the debtor”) filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. James J. Cain (“the trustee”) was appointed Chapter 11 trustee on September 1, 1992. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to convert the debtor's case to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 14, 1993, and reappointed Mr. Cain as the Chapter 7 trustee on June 3, 1993.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 351, and WILLIAM HOSEY, Plaintiffs, v.
DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE CIVIL NO. 98-2307 (JBS)
FILED: December 30, 1998 APPEARANCES:
Robert F. O'Brien, Esq.
Patricia A. Barasch, Esq.
TOMAR, SIMONOFF, ADOURIAN, O'BRIEN, KAPLAN, JACOBY & GRAZIANO 20 Brace Road Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Peter A. Gold, Esq.
Jonathan M. Korn, Esq.
BLANK ROME COMISKY & MCCAULEY LLP Woodland Falls Corporate Park 210 Lake Drive East, Suite 200
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002
Attorneys for Defendant SIMANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiffs, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 and William Hosey, filed this action in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47: 1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law, to obtain access to and copies of certified payroll records relating to certain construction work being carried out by defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority, for the PATCO High Speed Line project. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 25, 1998, in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County. Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 13, 1998, claiming original federal question jurisdiction. Now before the Court are three motions: plaintiffs' motion to remand the case back to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs “incurred as a result of the removal” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' motion for remand will be granted, but their motion for fees and costs will be denied. As this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the case, defendant's motion for summary judgment is not properly addressable by this Court.
I. BACKGROUND A. The Parties Defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority (“DRPA”), is a Congressionally-approved bi-state public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n Remand at 2.) It was created as the Delaware River Joint Commission in 1931 pursuant to the Compact Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution, and it was approved by Congress in 1932. (Id.) Its name changed to the Delaware River Port Authority in 1951, but its authorization - to build bridges, establish connecting roads, and provide transportation services within the Delaware River port district remained the same. (Id. at 3.)

JAMES NUGENT,
Plaintiff, v.
JOHN SIMPSON, Defendant.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE CIVIL NO. 98-2315(JBS)
OPINION Filed: May 26, 1999 APPEARANCES:
Michael Monheit, Esq.
Lee M. Diamondstein, Esq.
David J. Alexander, Esq.
Monheit, Monheit, Silverman & Fodera 2010 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert W. Thomas, Jr., Esq.
Duffy & Quinn The Curtis Center, Suite 1150
Independence Square West Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attorney for Defendant SIMANDLE, District Judge:
This case arises from an accident which plaintiff, James Nugent, had while attempting to serve a subpoena on the defendant, John Simpson. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligently responsible for the accident, and he seeks to recover damages, costs of suit, and attorneys fees. Now before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion will be granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendant.
I. BACKGROUND On October 16, 1996, at approximately 2: 00 p.m., plaintiff, who worked for Philadelphia Express Courier, arrived at defendant's home in Lindenwold, New Jersey, with the intention of serving a subpoena upon defendant to compel his attendance for deposition in a lawsuit filed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. (Nugent Dep. at 31: 9-23.) Plaintiff knocked on the door of defendant's home in an attempt to determine whether anyone was home, but no one responded. (Id. at 31:18 - 32: 2.) As plaintiff was knocking on the door and looking in the window (id. at 32: 13- 17), a car pulled up in front of the residence and three boys exited the car. (Id. at 33: 8-17.) Plaintiff did not know who these three boys were and did not ask them who they were. (Id. at 33:18-20; 34: 6-8). However, as the three boys approached the door, plaintiff greeted them and explained why he was there. (Id. at 33: 8-17.)
According to the defendant, none of the three boys was related to the defendant, but rather they were three friends of defendant's son. (Def.'s Br. at 1.) According to the plaintiff, one of the three boys either indicated that he was defendant's son or that he resided with defendant. (Nugent Dep. at 37: 2-4.) That same boy indicated that he did not want to get involved with the subpoena. (Id. at 37: 4-6.) Though no one used the words “come into the house” (id. at 38: 8-11), one of the boys said “let's see if anyone is home.” (Id. at 37: 4-7.) Following this statement, the boy opened the front door and walked in. (Id. at 37: 8-12.) The other two boys followed him, and plaintiff followed behind them. (Id.)

CHARLES L. THOMASON, Plaintiff, v.
NORMAN E. LEHRER, P.C., and NORMAN E. LEHRER, Defendants.
HON. STEPHEN M. ORLOFSKY CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2336
OPINION Appearances:
Charles L. Thomason, Esq., pro se The Galleria 2 Bridge Avenue P.O. Box 8160
Red Bank, NJ 07701
Norman E. Lehrer, Esq.
Norman E. Lehrer, P.C.
1205 North Kings Highway Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-1982
Attorneys for Defendants, Norman E. Lehrer, P.C. and Norman E. Lehrer, Esq.
ORLOFSKY, District Judge:
On August 21, 1998, Plaintiff, Charles L. Thomason, Esq. (“Thomason”), was Ordered to Show Cause by this Court why the remaining state-law counts of his Second Amended Complaint against Defendants, Norman E. Lehrer, P.C. and Norman E. Lehrer, Esq. (collectively “Lehrer”), should not be dismissed based upon the “litigation privilege” recognized by New Jersey law. In Thomason v. Lehrer, F.R.D. ; Civ. Action No. 98-2336, 1998 WL 518504, at *2, 14-15 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 1998), Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged a federal civil rights claim for abuse of process, was dismissed by this Court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Counts II through IV of the Second Amended Complaint allege only state-law claims against Lehrer: negligent misrepresentation (Counts II-III); and tortious interference (Count IV). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Thomason's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Thomason's state-law claims against Lehrer are based upon statements made by Lehrer in an amended answer and counterclaim filed on behalf of a client in another action pending before this Court. See Waterloov Gutter Protection Systems Co., Inc. v. Absolute Gutter Protection, LLC, et al., Civil Action No. 97-2554 (SMO) (“Waterloov action”). Rather than seeking redress in this Court against Lehrer, Thomason filed a civil rights action against Lehrer in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Lehrer removed the case to this Court. For the reasons set forth below, I will dismiss Thomason's remaining state law claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon New Jersey's “litigation privilege” which affords absolute immunity to attorneys, parties, and their representatives for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. In addition, in the exercise of this Court's inherent powers, I hold that an attorney who seeks to assert an abuse of process claim against an attorney-adversary based upon conduct which occurred in a case pending before a United States District Court, must seek redress in the District Court, and not in state court.

CHARLES L. THOMASON, Plaintiff, v.
NORMAN E. LEHRER, P.C., and NORMAN E. LEHRER, Defendants.
HON. STEPHEN M. ORLOFSKY CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2336
ORDER This matter having come before the Court on the Order to Show Cause Why Count I of the Amended Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim, Why Counts II Through IV Should Not Be Dismissed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed Against Charles L. Thomason, Esq. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court's Inherent Powers, entered on May 26, 1998, as amended on May 28, 1998, to provide that Plaintiff shall show cause as to why Count I of the Second Amended Complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff, Charles L. Thomason, Esq., appearing pro se, and Norman E. Lehrer, Esq. of Norman E. Lehrer, P.C. appearing on behalf of Defendants, Norman E. Lehrer, P.C. and Norman E. Lehrer, Esq.; and The Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and For the reasons set forth in an OPINION filed concurrently with this ORDER,
IT IS ORDERED on this 21st day of August, 1998, that Count I of the Second Amended Complaint be, and hereby is, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that within 30 days of the date of this ORDER Plaintiff shall, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 67.1, deposit $1,000 into the Court's Registry; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that within 30 days of the date of this ORDER Plaintiff shall pay $1,000 directly to Defendants; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that within eighteen months of the date of this ORDER, Plaintiff shall attend and satisfactory complete two seminars sponsored or offered by a law school accredited by the American Bar Association or a reputable provider of continuing legal education, one on federal practice and procedure and the other on attorney professionalism and professional conduct, and shall so attest by affidavit filed with the Court; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause on October 16, 1998, at 9: 30 a.m., why Counts II through IV of the Second Amended Complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to the litigation privilege as recognized under New Jersey law; and

CHARLES L. THOMASON, Plaintiff, v.
NORMAN E. LEHRER, P.C., and NORMAN E. LEHRER, Defendants.
HON. STEPHEN M. ORLOFSKY CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2336
OPINION Appearances:
Charles L. Thomason, Esq., pro se The Galleria 2 Bridge Avenue P.O. Box 8160
Red Bank, NJ 07701
Norman E. Lehrer, Esq.
Norman E. Lehrer, P.C.
1205 North Kings Highway Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-1982
Attorneys for Defendants, Norman E. Lehrer, P.C. and Norman E. Lehrer, Esq. ORLOFSKY, District Judge In what has unfortunately become a far too frequent occurrence in this era of “scorched-earth” litigation tactics, an errant attorney has lost sight of his professional obligations to his client, his profession, and this Court. What began in this Court as a relatively straightforward patent infringement dispute between two rain gutter manufacturers has now mushroomed into a separate, purported civil rights action brought by the attorney representing the plaintiff against the attorney representing the defendants in the patent dispute. The defendants in the patent action, represented by Norman E. Lehrer, Esq., alleged counterclaims against, among others, counsel for the plaintiffs, Charles L. Thomason, Esq. As a result of the counterclaims, Thomason and his firm were compelled to withdraw as plaintiff's counsel in the patent action. Instead of challenging the propriety of the factual allegations made by the patent case defendants in their counterclaims, either on their merits or through the mechanism of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Thomason instead chose to file a separate civil rights action against Lehrer and Lehrer's professional corporation in state court. After removal of the state court action to this Court, Thomason amended his complaint to allege again that Lehrer “committed [an] abuse of process under color of statute and state laws” merely because Lehrer, on behalf of his clients, had alleged and served counterclaims upon Thomason.
On its own motion and pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause, the details of which are discussed below. After careful consideration, I find Thomason's conduct in this case to be intolerable and unprofessional. His actions were motivated by meanspiritedness and petulance, and driven by his ego, rather than his client's interests. Based upon the undisputed facts of record before me, I conclude that the frivolous civil rights action filed by Thomason in state court and then prosecuted in this Court was initiated solely to harass and retaliate against Lehrer.

CHAMBERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.
NICHOLAS H. POLITAN FEDERAL BUILDING & U.S.COURTHOUSE JUDGE 50 WALNUT ST., ROOM 5076
P.O. BOX 999
NEWARK, N.J. 07101-0999
May 10, l999 LETTER ORDER Tomas Espinosa, Esq.
340 Palisade Ave.
Jersey City, NJ 07307
Attorney for Plaintiffs The Republic of Peru Palacio DeGobierno (Casa de Gobierno)
Plaza de armas Lima,
Republica del Peru 100 Hamilton Plaza Suite 1221
Paterson, NJ 07505
Defendant Re: Victoria Batchelor, et al v. Republic of Peru Civil Action No. 98-239 (NHP)
Dear Mr. Espinosa:
This matter comes before the Court on Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges' Report and Recommendation, filed April 16, 1999, to dismiss the Complaint filed by plaintiffs Victoria Batchelor, Luis Alcantara, Dionicia Alcantara, Orlando Alcantara and Angela Alcantara ("plaintiffs"). The Court has decided this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. Having received no substantive reply from plaintiffs and after careful consideration of the record, the Court will ADOPT Judge Hedges' Report and Recommendation and DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.
DISCUSSION This Court shall now make a de novo determination whether to accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings made by the Magistrate Judge. Local Rule 40D. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a Magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the district court unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1985).
In determining whether it is appropriate to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice, this Court finds ample support in the record to sustain Judge Hedges' findings made pursuant to the analysis set forth in the Report and Recommendation and the discussion herein.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Since it is undisputed that defendant, The Republic of Peru ("defendant") is a foreign state, plaintiffs' request for entry of default judgment must be addressed in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereafter "FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §1602, et seq.

KEVIN DARRYL HAYES, Plaintiff, v.
SCO PRIMENTAL, SCO SADIQ and JANE and JOHN DOES, Defendants.
Civ. No. 98-2421 (DRD)
Kevin Darryl Hayes # 267099
South Woods State Prison 215 Burlington Road South Bridgeton, New Jersey 08302
Pro se plaintiff Adriana M. Calderon, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General R.J. Hughes Justice Complex P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Attorneys for defendants DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Kevin Darryl Hayes, a New Jersey State prisoner incarcerated at the South Woods State Prison ("South Woods"), instituted this action for alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, Senior Corrections Officers Ruben Pimentel and Abukar Sadiq, move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel and to amend the Complaint to add "Officer Smith" as the name of the "John Doe" defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion will be granted, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel will be dismissed as moot and his motion to amend will be denied as futile.
BACKGROUND The following facts have been taken from the Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. Plaintiff alleges that on July 17, 1996, while incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison ("EJSP"), Defendants utilized excessive force upon him in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleges that on that date at approximately 8: 15 p.m., Officer Pimentel spoke to Plaintiff in a "disrespectful manner" and used "vulgar obscenities" in ordering Plaintiff to lock back in his cell. Compl., Statement of Facts. Plaintiff claims that he called to Officer Sadiq, the Second Wing Officer, to explain the situation to him. Id. Officer Sadiq told Plaintiff to wait for his phone time. Id. Plaintiff claims that while speaking to Officer Sadiq an inmate named Davis, who was passing out ice, came to Plaintiff's cell. Id. At that point, Officer Sadiq allegedly told Officer Pimentel to open Plaintiff's cell door so Plaintiff could get his ice. Id.
Plaintiff claims that once his cell door was opened, Officer Pimentel called Plaintiff to his desk which was approximately 15- 20 feet away from his cell and that Pimentel told Plaintiff that "this was his wing and he'll do what he wanted." Id. Plaintiff's response to Officer Pimentel was that the officer "was miserable." Id. Plaintiff claims that Officer Pimentel responded by stating that Plaintiff's family "would be miserable" when they came to visit Plaintiff. Id.

GERALD B. SHREIBER, Plaintiff, v.
ROBERT A. MASTROGIOVANNI & THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendants. HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2515 (JEI)
OPINION APPEARANCES:
BLANK ROME COMISKY & MCCAULEY LLP By: William C. Mead, Jr.
Woodland Falls Corporate Park 210 Lake Drive East, Suite 200
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002
Counsel for Plaintiff Gerald Shreiber UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE By: R. Scott Clarke, Trial Attorney, Tax Ben Franklin Station P.O. Box 227
Washington, D.C. 20044
Counsel for Defendants
IRENAS, District Judge:
Presently before this Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Robert Mastrogiovanni and the Internal Revenue Service, as to the claims of the plaintiff, Gerald B. Shreiber. The plaintiff alleges that during an Internal Revenue Service audit of his income taxes, the defendants, acting under the color of federal law, violated his constitutional rights. In making this motion for summary judgment, the defendants appear willing to accept the allegations of the plaintiff, but simultaneously deny their veracity. Since the defendants dispute potentially material facts, the plaintiff argues that this motion should be characterized as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This Court agrees and will treat the motion accordingly and accept the allegations of the plaintiff as true.
Because this court finds that (i) a Bivens remedy is unavailable in light of the existing congressional structure already providing remedies for improper tax collection and (ii) any cause of action for improper IRS conduct has not yet accrued, plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint will be granted.
IBACKGROUND Working as a revenue agent with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in 1995 and 1996, defendant Robert A. Mastrogiovanni ("Mastrogiovanni") conducted a tax audit of the plaintiff, Gerald B. Shreiber ("Shreiber"), for the tax years 1991, 1992 and 1993. The plaintiff alleges that Mastrogiovanni conducted the audit with a motivation to discriminate against Shreiber because of his religious beliefs. Shreiber asserts that on August 11, 1995, Mastrogiovanni left a voice mail message at Shreiber's place of business stating: "[h]ey you Jew bastard piece of shit. This is White Trash. I am going to get you."

IN RE GREATE BAY HOTEL & CASINO, INC., a New Jersey Corporation; GB HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and, GB FUNDING CORP., a Delaware Corporation, Debtors.
STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Indenture Trustee, Appellant, v.
GREATE BAY HOTEL & CASINO, INC., a New Jersey Corporation; GB HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and, GB FUNDING CORP., a Delaware Corporation, Appellees.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE CIVIL NO. 98-2647(JBS)
On Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, the Honorable Judith H. Wizmur presiding, Bankruptcy Number 98-10001 (JW).
Filed: March 19, 1999 APPEARANCES:
Richard Hiersteiner, Esq.
Mark C. Rosenthal, Esq.
Palmer & Dodge LLP One Beacon Street Boston, Massachusetts 02108
and Richard M. Meth, Esq.
Friedman Siegelbaum LLP Seven Becker Farm Road Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1757
Attorneys for Appellant Paul R. DeFilippo, Esq.
Frederick H. Kraus, Esq.
James N. Lawlor, Esq.
Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione One Riverfront Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07102-5497
Attorney for Appellees Eric A. Browndorf, Esq.
Patrick F. Cox, Esq.
Cooper Perskie April Niedelman Wagenheim & Levenson 1125 Atlantic Avenue Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401

RAFAEL FELICIANO CASADO: HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS Petitioner,: Civil No. 98-2654 (JEI)
v.:
OPINION DENYING PETITION E.W. MORRIS, WARDEN,: FOR HABEAS CORPUS FCI FAIRTON,:
Respondent.:
APPEARANCES:
RAFAEL FELICIANO CASADO Reg. No. 03941-069
FCI Fairton P.O. Box 420
Fairton, NJ 08320
Petitioner pro se FAITH S. HOCHBERG United States Attorney By: Louis J. Bizzarri Assistant U.S. Attorney Mithell E. Cohen Courthouse John F. Gerry Plaza Fourth & Cooper Streets Camden, NJ 08101
Counsel for Respondent IRENAS, District Judge:
I.
Petitioner Rafael Feliciano Casado (“Casado) is currently incarcerated at FCI Fairton. He was sentenced on December 29, 1987, in the United States District Court of Puerto Rico for having been a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), having received a firearm stolen from the United States government, 18 U.S.C. § 641, and escape from federal custody, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). He received consecutive terms of ten years, five years and five years, respectively, for each of the three convictions. Casado was given credit against this aggregate 20 year sentence for the periods from August 16, 1986, the date of his original federal arrest, through September 17, 1986, the date of his escape, and March 17, 1987, the date of his recapture, through December 29, 1997, the date on which he was sentenced.
Following his sentencing in federal court, petitioner was returned to the custody of Puerto Rico to finish serving a sentence resulting from his violation of probation stemming from a 1980 superior court conviction for voluntary manslaughter.
On August 9, 1988, Casado pled guilty in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico to transporting a loaded weapon, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, § 418, receiving and transporting unlawfully appropriated property, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4274, and two counts of controlled substances violation, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 2401. The weapons charge and the unlawful appropriation charge arose from the same facts which underlay the similar federal convictions. Casado was sentenced to six months on the unlawful appropriation charge and three years on each of the other three charges. However, the trial judge ordered that all four sentences were to run concurrently with each other and with the federal sentence which had previously been imposed.
Casado continued in commonwealth custody and completed serving his Puerto Rican sentences on January 2, 1991, at which time he was remanded to federal custody to complete the service of his 20 year federal sentence.
Presently before this Court is Casado's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Casado claims that i) his state and federal convictions relating to the illegal appropriation and possession of a firearm violate the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; ii) the District Court improperly instructed the jury; and iii) although the state court judge ordered that Casado's federal and state sentences run concurrently, the Bureau of Prisons did not credit him for any time served while in the custody of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

ROBERT TREGLIA, REG. NO. 10860-014, Petitioner, v.
ART BEELER, WARDEN FCI FORT DIX, Respondent.
Civil Action
No. 98-2693 (JBS)
OPINION Filed: March 23, 1999 APPEARANCES:
Robert Treglia Register No. 10860-014
P.O. Box 7000
Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640
Petitioner Pro Se.
Faith S. Hochberg United States Attorney By: Dorothy J. Donnelly Assistant United States Attorney 402 East State Street, Room 502
Trenton, NJ 08608
Attorney for Respondent.
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is before the court on pro se petitioner Robert Treglia's petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Treglia, who on August 28, 1998 successfully completed the 500 hour Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) operated by the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), alleges that the BOP has improperly denied him eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides that prisoners “convicted of a nonviolent offense” shall be eligible for a sentence reduction of up to one year upon completion of the RDAP. The court finds that the BOP has improperly based its decision to deny Treglia eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B) on facts other than those that form the basis for the elements of the offenses for which Treglia was convicted, in violation of the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1997), and that Treglia has established his threshold eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, the court remands this matter to the BOP for consideration of whether Treglia, as a person eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(b), should actually be granted a sentence reduction, and for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the accompanying Order.
BACKGROUND Treglia is presently incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix serving a sentence of 110 months imprisonment, to be followed by five years supervised release, imposed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut on January 21, 1993, upon his conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Treglia's sentence was enhanced under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 because a loaded .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol was found in his car at the time of his arrest. Treglia's projected release date is December 31, 1999.

CAMDEN VICINAGE HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE EVELYN F. BINKOWSKI and JOHN BINKOWSKI, individually and as husband and wife, and ROSEMARIE BELONSOFF and JOHN BELONSOFF, individually and as husband and wife, Plaintiffs,Doc. No. 15
v.Civil No. 98-2732 (JBS)
THOMAS A. MARINI and POL-RO, INC., Defendants.
Appearances:
Edward C. Logan, Esquire 911 Route 33
Hamilton Square, NJ 08690
Attorney for Plaintiffs N. Nicholas Hendershot, Esquire 309 Fellowship Road Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054
Attorney for Defendants KUGLER, United States Magistrate Judge This matter is before the Court upon motion by N. Nicholas Hendershot, Esquire, attorney for Defendants, for an order disqualifying Edward C. Logan, Esquire, attorney for Plaintiffs, from this case. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. Facts and Procedural History This action arises from a two-vehicle accident that occurred in Burlington, New Jersey. See Statement of Facts and Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Edward C. Logan, Esquire, as Counsel for Plaintiffs (“Defendants' Brief”) at 1. Plaintiff John Belensoff was driving a Winnebego in which Plaintiffs Rosemarie Belensoff, John's wife, Evelyn Binkowski and John Binkowski were passengers. See Certification of Edward C. Logan in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel (“Logan Certification”) at ¶ 2. The accident occurred when Defendant Thomas Marini collided with the Winnebego while driving a Ford station wagon owned by his employer, Defendant Pol-Ro, Inc. (“Pol-Ro”). See Defendants' Brief at 1-2. The investigating police officer cited Plaintiff John Belensoff for careless driving. See id. at 2. This action followed.
Plaintiffs Evelyn Binkowski and John Binkowski filed a complaint against Defendants in this Court alleging that they were severely injured in the accident. Plaintiffs Rosemarie Belensoff and John Belensoff filed a separate complaint alleging that Rosemarie Belensoff was injured in the accident and asserting a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of John Belensoff, the driver of the Winnebego. The two actions were consolidated on or about September 25, 1998. All four Plaintiffs are represented by Edward C. Logan, Esquire.

DONNA RAGGIO and REGINA DAVISON,: No. 98-cv-2782 (SSB)
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly:
situated,: OPINION Plaintiffs,:
vs.:
OMEGA INSTITUTE, INC.; LEE E. COBLEIGH;:
FRANKLIN BURKE; DR. CLARITA EUSEBIO-:
KELLY; RAYMOND PAPIN; and SHARON E.:
GREMMELS,:
Defendants.:
THE LAW FIRM OF PHILIP STEPHEN FUOCO 24 Wilkins Place Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033
By: Philip Stephen Fuoco, Esquire Joseph A. Osefchen, Esquire Attorneys for Plaintiffs FLORIO & PERUCCI, P.C.
371 Hoes Lane Piscataway, New Jersey 08854
By: Michael J. Perrucci, Esquire Edward J. Boccher, Esquire Glenn A. Clouser, Esquire Eltia I. Montano, Esquire Michele A. Daitz, Esquire Attorneys for Defendants
BROTMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE:
The factual background to this case is more fully set forth in a companion opinion issued this date, United States of America, ex rel. Haskins, et al v. Omega Institute, et al., 95-cv-265 (SSB), a qui tam case originally based on the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, federal and state racketeering claims, and various other state law causes of action. On May 4, 1998, counsel for the plaintiffs herein filed an action captioned Raggio, et al. v. Omega Institute, et al., GLO-L-849-98 in New Jersey Superior Court, Gloucester County, seeking class certification as to counts which are similar in nature to those which plaintiffs in Haskins voluntarily dismissed in this Court on May 6, 1998, accompanied by several new causes of action.
On June 9, 1998, defendants herein and in Haskins filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, or alternatively for the Court to assume jurisdiction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Then, on June 19, 1998, defendants filed a motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 42 to consolidate the state action with the federal action currently before this Court. In response, plaintiffs herein filed a motion on June 23, 1998 by counsel for plaintiffs to remand GLO-L-849-98 to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for costs and fees associated therewith. These motions are now pending before the Court and are ripe for decision.
I. Defendants' Notice of Removal Defendants' primary basis for removal can be summarized as follows:
Removal is based upon the federal question jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks, among other things, a determination that Defendants breached contracts they entered into with federal governmental agencies in accord with various federal laws and regulations, of which the Plaintiffs allegedly were third-party beneficiaries and reimbursement of federal funds which were distributed pursuant to the Job Training Partnership Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and the Federal Student Loan and Grant Programs, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated United States Department of Education requirements and regulations and that the Defendants filed false reports and claims with federal agencies.

NELSON O. DUARTE,:
Petitioner,:
-v-:
Civil Action No.
98-281 (AMW)
JOHN M. HURLEY &:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE: OPINION OF NEW JERSEY, WENDY ALICE WAY,:
Dated: October 28, 1998
Defendants.:
JOEL A. PISANO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Before the Court is petitioner's application for appointment of counsel. Defendants have not filed opposition, and the Court decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's application is denied.
BACKGROUND On June 19, 1980, petitioner was indicted for various offenses arising out of the March 25, 1980, riot at the Essex County Jail in Newark, New Jersey. The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, conducted a jury trial that lasted ten days, and the jury convicted petitioner of (1) third degree attempted escape, (2) committing acts of riot in the fourth degree, and (3) third degree possession of an implement of escape. The trial court sentenced petitioner to ten years in prison for attempted escape and possession of an implement of escape. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the appellate division of the superior court, which affirmed his convictions and sentence in an opinion dated November 13, 1985. Subsequently, petitioner sought review by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, but was denied certification on October 15, 1986.
“Duarte then slumbered for ten years before filing [his first] application for a writ of habeas corpus on May 7, 1996.” Duarte v. Hershberger, 947 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.N.J. 1996). Judge Wolin dismissed without prejudice Duarte's first petition because at that time he had failed to exhaust state remedies for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, Judge Wolin declined discretionary review of petitioner's application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). See Duarte, 947 F. Supp. at 150. Duarte then filed his current petition for a writ of habeas corpus on January 22, 1998. DISCUSSION A plaintiff in a civil suit has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel. A court, however, has the discretionary authority to appoint counsel to represent an indigent plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d). See Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). When deciding whether to appoint counsel under Section 1915, the Court must be persuaded that the plaintiff's claim has some merit in law and fact. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). If it finds the plaintiff's claim has merit, the Court must then weigh a variety of factors to decide whether it is appropriate to appoint counsel.
According to Tabron, the district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for appointment of counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d). See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153. As a threshold matter, the Tabron guidelines state that the case must have arguable legal and factual merit. See id. at 155. If the court finds that the indigent plaintiff's claim has arguable merit in law and fact, the court then examines a number of additional factors such as the plaintiff's ability to present the case, the complexity or degree of difficulty of the legal issues involved, the degree to which factual investigation will be required and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue such investigation, and the extent to which the case will turn on credibility determinations and experts. See id. at 156. Finally, the court should consider any factors weighing against appointing counsel, the limited supply of competent lawyers willing to undertake such representation without compensation, and the value of lawyers' time. See id. at 157.

< < < IN RE CENDANT CORPORATION : Civ. No. 98-2819 (WHW)
PRIDES LITIGATION:
Walls, District Judge This matter is before the Court on the application of Roger W. Kirby of Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, Lead Counsel for the Prides class (“Lead Counsel”), for approval of the proposed settlement with Cendant Corp. and for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses. Howard B. Sirota, counsel for the Joanne A. Aboff Family Trust U/A dated 2/11/92 (“Aboff Family Trust”), has objected to Lead Counsel's fee request on the ground that it is excessive. Previously, counsel for the Aboff Family Trust had objected to the settlement on the basis of a confidential supplemental agreement incorporated in the settlement, but this objection has been withdrawn. On May 18, 1999, the Court heard oral argument of these matters. The Court also raised, sua sponte, the application of counsel for the Aboff Family Trust for attorneys' fees. The settlement is approved subject to the modifications to attorneys' fees described herein. The application of counsel for the Aboff Family Trust for attorneys' fees is denied.
BACKGROUND Cendant was formed on December 17, 1997, through the merger of CUC International, Inc. (“CUC”) and HFS, Inc. (“HFS”). In February, 1998, Cendant and its wholly owned subsidiary, Cendant Capital I, issued a derivative-type convertible security known as Cendant FELINE PRIDES (“Prides”) in an initial public offering (“Prides Offering”) pursuant to a registration statement, a prospectus, and a prospectus supplement filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The registration statement and the prospectus contained Cendant's audited and consolidated statements of income for the three years ended December 31, 1996 and the Company's unaudited financial results for 1997. The Prides Offering, which involved the sale of approximately 29,900,000 Prides valued at $1.5 billion, closed on March 2, 1998. Defendants Merrill Lynch & Co., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (collectively “Merrill Lynch”), and Chase Securities Inc. (“Chase”) were the underwriters.
The registration statement and the prospectus offered two types of Prides: Income Prides and Growth Prides. Each of the Income Prides consists of a unit comprised of a Purchase Contract under which the holder will purchase from Cendant on February 16, 2001 a specified number of newly issued shares of Cendant common stock for $50 (the “Stated Amount”) in cash. Cendant will pay the holders of Income Prides “Contract Adjustment Payments” at the rate of 5% of the Stated Amount per year, an interest in Trust Preferred Securities paying 6.45% of the Stated Amount per year, and $50 at maturity. Each of the Growth Prides consists of a unit comprised of a Purchase Contract under which the holder will purchase from Cendant on February 16, 2001 a specified number of newly issued shares of Cendant common stock for the Stated Amount in cash. Cendant will pay the holders of Growth Prides “Contract Adjustment Payments” at the rate of 5% of the Stated Amount per year and a 1/20th undivided beneficial interest in a treasury security having a principal amount of $1000 and maturing in 2001.
On April 15, 1998, Cendant announced that it had discovered accounting irregularities in a former CUC business unit and that Cendant's financial statements for 1997, and possibly earlier years, would be restated. Thereafter, a number of purchasers of Prides as well as other Cendant securities filed class actions against Cendant and other defendants including Merrill Lynch. On May 29, 1998, this Court consolidated all of the actions then pending against Cendant under In re Cendant Corporation Litigation, Civ. No. 98-1664 (WHW). On June 15, 1998, another class action was brought on behalf of the purchasers of Prides, Welch & Forbes, Inc. v. Cendant Corporation, et al. Civ. No. 98-2819 (WHW), which was also consolidated with the 98-1664 action. In its Opinion and Order of September 8, 1998, this Court appointed Welch & Forbes lead plaintiff for all claims based on purchases of Prides in the In re Cendant Corporation Litigation action. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998).

Hon. Dickinson R. Debevoise DAVID G. WILSON,: Civ. No. 98-2928 (DRD)
Plaintiff,:
v.:
THOMAS RUSSO, JAMES LALOR,:
ROCCO MISCIA, and SEAN:
NICKSON,:
Defendants.:
David G. Wilson South Woods State Prison #200638
215 Burlington Road South Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Pro Se Plaintiff Richard Seltzer, Esq.
Assistant Township Attorney Township of Montclair 205 Claremont Avenue Montclair, NJ 07042
Attorneys for Defendants DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge In this Section 1983 action, a pro se prisoner is suing several police officers for allegedly using excessive force when they placed him under arrest. The police officers, Thomas Russo, James Lalor, Rocco Miscia, and Sean Nickson (“Defendants”), have moved to stay or dismiss this action on the grounds that a parallel action is currently proceeding in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The motions are to be disposed of on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. Plaintiff cross-moved to remove his state court action to the federal court.
I. BACKGROUND Defendants in this matter are all members of the Montclair Township Police Department and were allegedly involved in the apprehension and arrest of the plaintiff, David G. Wilson (“Wilson”), on March 17, 1998. On that date, Wilson was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting arrest, possession of burglar's tools, aggravated assault, and robbery. See Seltzer Cert. ¶ 2. Wilson is currently incarcerated in the South Woods State Prison as a result of a parole violation arising from a burglary conviction on September 11, 1992. Id.
Wilson alleges that on the date of his arrest by the Montclair Police, Defendants used excessive force when bringing him into custody. Id. Exhibit F. Wilson claims that Officer Nickson began beating him while he was handcuffed and lying on the ground and that the beating continued in both the back of the police car and in the police station. Id. Wilson alleges that as a result of this abuse, he required medical attention at a local hospital. Id. Additionally, Wilson claims that the remaining defendants stood by and watched Nickson beat him and failed to stop the battery. Id. Wilson filed a